THE RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL vs. THE PROTECTION OF PUBLIC MORALS
In People v. Jelkel the defendant was convicted of two crimes of compulsory prostitution in violation of the New York Penal Law.
2
Members of the press and public were excluded from the courtroom during the People's case except for such friends as the defendant requested. 3 In his exclusion order the trial judge stated that in the interest of public decency he was compelled to draw the curtain on the offensive obscenity of the highly publicized trial. 4 On appeal, Jelke's conviction was reversed on the ground that his statutory right to a public trial had been violated although there was sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict of the jury.,
1284 App. Div. 211, 130 N.Y.S. 2d 662 (1st Dep't 1954) .
2 Section 2460. The original indictment contained nine counts.
3 During the People's case, which comprised nine trial days, seventeen different friends of Jelke or his attorney attended the trial. No more than twelve and always at least one were present each day.
4 Counsel for Pat Ward, the State's principal witness, originally made application to have the public excluded during her testimony. After granting this request the trial judge recalled its ruling until arguments could be heard. Upon completion of the arguments, the trial judge issued the exclusion order on his own motion.
5 The majority considered the judge's interrogation of two jurors concerning their impartiality as serious error although basing the reversal on the fact that Jelke was denied a pubic trial. The court The right of an accused to a public trial is thought to be of ancient English origin and emanates from an Anglo-American distrust for secret proceedings. 6 Various definitions have been given a public trial, ranging from a triar which is not completely secret 7 to one where all who wish to attend may do so. 8 While the right to a public trial exists primarily for the benefit of the accused, 9 some courts have thought that this right belongs to the public as well.' 0 The Federal Constitution" and the constitualso held that the trial judge compounded his original error by excluding the press and public onlyduring the People's case. 6 For a discussion of the development of the public trial concept see Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 Temple L. Q. 381 (1932) . 7 People v. Miller, 257 N.Y. 54, 177 N.E. 306. (1931) . Keddington v. State, 19 Ariz. 457, 459, 112 Pac. 273, 274 (1918 and as yet the elements necessary to constitute a public trial under the due process concept are but loosely defined. 15 Extreme cases, such as the summary punishment of a witness for contempt in a secret one-judge grand jury proceeding have, of course, been held invalid.
16
While New York's constitution contains no provision guaranteeing a public trial, it has been provided for by legislative enactment. Much of the difficulty in the Jelke case revolved around the construction of one of these statutes, Section 4 of the Judiciary Law which reads as follows :18
The sittings of every court within this state shall be public and every citizen may freely attend the same, except trials in cases for divorce, seduction, abortion, rape, assault with intent to commit rape, sodomy, bastardy or filiation, the court may, in its discretion, exclude therefrom all persons who are not directly interested therein, excepting jurors, witnesses, and officers of the court.
Where the formal charge in a case of a salacious nature is not one enumerated in Section 4, a question is raised as to the intended scope of the statute. The court in People v. Jelke, by adopting a strict construction, held that the discretion in the trial judge to exclude all persons not essential to the proceedings is limited to cases where the formal charge is so enumerated. By its strict construction, the majority overruled the only New York decision construing the scope of Section 4, People v. Hall.
9 There a general exclusionary order was issued barring the press and public from a trial where the accused was charged with extortion but where the testimony was largely concerned with an alleged act of sodomy. On appeal, Section 4 was broadly construed, the court holding that the salacious nature of the case rather than the formal charge determined the trial court's power to exclude the press and public. 20 "If a literal interpretation is to be given to these provisions, then the trial judge is utterly without any discretion whatever aside from the excepted cases. Whoever desires to come into court, however revolting may be the evidence adduced, the doors must swing inward to him. School children, the street urchins, girls of immature years, may drink in and become poisoned by the lustful details wormed from the witnesses. That the protection of a 'public trial must be given to every defendant charged-with a crime is obvious. No court in this nation has ever held otherwise, so far as I am able to ascertain. That principle must be upheld unimpaired, but its retention does not entirely wrest from the trial judge the discretion to conduct the trial in such wise as to be consonant with good morals and common decency and in an orderly manner." Id. [VOL. 45 construed, the retention of such term or clause in a subsequent amendatory act generally requires that it shall receive the same construction."3 Since legislative history shows an intent to make Section 4 conform with the Hall case, the latter's liberal construction of the statute was apparently endorsed, although the addition of the single word "sodomy" would seem inept for the purpose.
Assuming, however, that both the original section and its subsequent amendnient are sufficiently vague to permit of two diverse interpretations, it would seem that the court was primarily concerned with protecting the public trial cbncept. The deleterious effect on public morals and decency, which the publicity attendant to this, notorious trial could have, apparently was relegated to a position -of secondary importance. No public trial provision has ever been held to deprive a judge of his power to regulate attendance to the extent necessary to assure the security and orderly progress of a trial. Instances where a judge has invoked this inherent power are numerous. 26 However, these are cases where the necessity of such procedure is readily apparent.
McKinney's Consolidated Ladws,. Construction
And Interpretation of Statutes, §19j, p.,268 (1st ed. 1942).
24 The rationale for this apparent shift in emphasis during the period between the Hall and Jelke decisions might be that a free press and public trials have become more highly valued when appraised in the light of the totalitarian abuses witnessed in much of the world during the last half century. Also society's prohibitions against discussions of anything of a sexual nature are now less stringent. The decisions are in conflict where there has been a general exclusionary order in a trial of a salacious nature. The controversy ostensibly centers around the scope of "public trial." Where only members of the bar, 27 representatives of the press, 2 2 those "having business in the, court," 29 or friends and relatives of theaccused,30 as in the instant case, have beem admitted some courts have reversed the conviction because the trial was not open to all.3" Other courts have considered the trial public where any of these special classes have been present.n Admitting the propriety of certainexceptions, however, the more fundamental problem would seem to be that of decidingwhether protection of public morals merits inclusion in these exceptions.
The benefits commonly ascribed to a trial being public permit of division into two categories, those accruing to the public and thosewhich protect the accused.n Among the first class are said to be: permitting the public to observe the functioning of the judicial process, fulfilling their desire to see justice properly administered and, to a certain class, financial benefit from reproducing accounts of the proceedings. Since a member of the public, suing as such, has never been held to have a legally enforceable right to admittance where he has. been excluded, 4 it would appear that the public's interest is limited to the benefits resulting from their unrestricted admission ta 27 State v. Hensley, 75 Ohio St. 225, 79 N.E. 462" (1906 "For an enumeration and discussion of the benefits of a public trial see 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1834-(3rd ed. 1940).
4 United Press Ass'ns v. Valenti, 281 App. Div-395, 120 N.Y.S. 2d 174, 179 (1st Dep't 1953) . inost trials. Moreover, in most jurisdictions, an accused may waive his right to a public trial and thereby effectively curtail any benefits to the public from observation of that particular trial.
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The principal benefits afforded the accused by a public trial 3 6 are said to be: limiting the temptation of witnesses to testify falsely and increasing the possibility that those who do so will be detected, enabling persons with additional information to learn of the proceeding and come forward, and insuring a more conscientious performance of their duties by judge, jury, and counsel.
Today it would appear that the realization of these benefits is largely dependent on widespread press coverage since personal courtroom attendance is no longer a common pastime with the public.
3 The practical result is that an accused in a newsworthy case is the recipient of a disproportionate amount of publicity while the bulk of criminal prosecutions are conducted in comparative anonymity. Hence the question of whether the public is freely admitted or only special classes are allowed to be present would appear to be of decreasing significance in cases which are little publicized. However, the true value of a public trial is not predicated upon the protection it affords an accused in a particular case but stems rather from a conviction that justice will be ultimately better served if the judicial process is performed openly rather than in secret. 38 Certainly the efforts of an able coun- Is "All the reasons for requiring publicity are of a contingent and abstract nature. In the long run certain general advantages are secured by a usual practice. No tangible and positive advantage is gained for a party in a given case by publicity or lost by privacy. Moreover, since the whole community cannot enter, the exclusion of some only sel and the operation of our system of appeals offer an accused more concrete protection than does the presence of a segment of the public at his trial. Many states 39 and noted text writers4O have considered the interest of public decency a worthy motive for curtailing publicity where a trial is largely concerned with salacious detail. From the nature of the protection afforded by a public trial, its benefits would not appear to be lost by allowing such exceptions.
In the Jelke case, the trial judge's exclusion order was primarily intended to curtail the extensive and sensational press coverage accorded Jelke's 4 ' arrest and trial. In an independent collateral proceeding,4 the newspapers attempted to gain admittance to the court room by petitioning for a writ of prohibition against the trial judge. However, the Appellate Division held that the petitioners had no standing to demand admittance to a criminal proceeding to which they were not a party. Freedom of the press was held not to be viowho might have entered does no definite harm. Finally, in certain conditions, the advantages may be overbalanced by disadvantages. The rule therefore need not be absolute and invariable. Exceptions may properly be recognized. It is an excess of sentimental obstinacy to deny the propriety of allowing exceptions. Wigmore, Evidence § 1835.
39The statutes are collected in Wigmore, Evidence, §1836.
40 Both Wigmore and Cooley have recognized the protection of public morals as a valid reason for making an exception to the public trial requirement. See notes 39, 9 supra.
41 "As early as last August the publicity in this case reached a ship's newspaper in the Mediterranean. It has now skyrocketed to the point where we find it competing with the President's message on the State of the Union. It is reported that the press of three continents are reporting this trial. It is the opinion of this court that such extensive press coverage to a case of this kind is catering to vulgar sensationalism, if not actual depravity." Excerpt from the exclusion order, Brief for Appellees, p. 64. Prior to the exclusion order, 64 seats had been reserved for the press, leaving 56 for the general public.
12 United Press Ass 'ns v. Valenti; 203 Misc. 220, 120 N.Y.S. 2d 642, ayf'd, 281 App. Div. 395, 120 N.Y.S. 2d 174 (1st Dep't 1953) .
